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Abstract
Concern with the threshold applied in cost-effectiveness analyses by bodies
such as NICE distracts attention from their biased use of the principle. The bias
results from the prior requirement that an intervention be effective (usually
'clinically effective') before its cost-effectiveness is considered. The underlying
justification for the use of cost-effectiveness as a criterion, whatever the
threshold adopted, is that decisions in a resource-constrained system have
opportunity costs. Their existence rules out any restriction to those
interventions that are 'incrementally cost-effective' at a chosen threshold and
requires acceptance of those that are 'decrementally cost-effective' at the same
threshold. Interventions that fall under the linear ICER line in the South-West
quadrant of the cost-effectiveness plane are cost-effective because they create
net health benefits, as do those in the North-East quadrant. If there is objection
to the fact that they are cost-effective by reducing effectiveness as well as
costs, it is possible to reject them, but only on policy grounds other than their
failure to be cost-effective. Having established this, the paper considers and
seeks to counter the arguments based on these other grounds. Most notably
these include those proposing a different threshold in the South-West quadrant
from the North-East one, i.e. propose a 'kinked ICER'. Another undesirable
consequence of the biased use of cost-effectiveness is the failure to stimulate
innovations that would increase overall health gain by being less effective in the
condition concerned, but generate more benefits elsewhere. NICE can only
reward innovations that cost more.
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Introduction
The publication of the Claxton report containing an estimate 
of the willingness to pay for an incremental Quality-Adjusted 
Life Year (QALY) implicit in the expenditure patterns of the NHS 
of England and Wales has refocused attention on the use by the 
National Institute for Care and Health Excellence (NICE) of cost-
effectiveness as one criterion in its reimbursement decisions1,2. The 
suggestion that the empirical threshold for cost-effectiveness is 
about £13,000 (but probably lower), compared with the £20,000 
to £30000 range acknowledged by NICE, assumes greater signifi-
cance in the context of the growing adoption of the NICE model, or 
some version of it, in other jurisdictions facing the same challenges. 
The introduction and use of the formal and relatively transparent 
NICE process has undoubtedly been a major advance, compared 
with the situation in countries who are in official denial about the 
need to prioritise and do so with some transparency. The idea that 
any resource-constrained health or other public service can function 
efficiently and equitably -and hence ethically - without employing 
cost-effectiveness as a key principle we take to be absurd. How 
the principle - which would be better called opportunity cost- 
effectiveness - is implemented, is the only issue. There are numer-
ous valid and important debates to be had on this, including the one 
that concerns us here.
The NICE advance has been bought at the price of biased use of 
the principle of cost-effectiveness and, as a corollary, biased sup-
port for innovative technologies. These biases are built into its legal 
obligations. NICE is, formally speaking, an independent ‘non- 
governmental public body’ whose remit comes from the Depart-
ment of Health, which funds it. That remit is to appraise the clinical 
and cost-effectiveness of technology x within its licensed indication 
for treating disease y. To be considered in the scoping process for 
possible appraisal, the technology must be ‘either new or an inno-
vative modification of an existing technology with claimed benefits 
to patients or the NHS judged against the comparator(s).’ The pur-
pose of the NICE appraisal is to decide whether the new technology 
works well (is clinically effective) and good value for money (is 
cost-effective). At no stage of the scoping or appraisal process is 
an innovation that claims to be cost-effective and ‘good value for 
money’, but not ‘clinically effective’ in relation to the compara-
tors, eligible for consideration. So there is no point in their being 
put forward. Formally, the ban on such innovations is imposed on 
NICE from above, but there has never been any indication that the 
organisation is other than in full agreement with it, and accordingly 
with the biased use of the cost-effectiveness principle involved in 
prior filtering by clinical effectiveness.
This is not an empirical issue. The major project by Claxton and 
colleagues has yielded important insights into the cost-effectiveness 
threshold implicit in the behaviour of the NHS, establishing the 
average cost of an extra QALY generated (conservatively put at 
£12,396), the number of QALYs likely to be forgone as a conse-
quence of approving a more expensive technology, and where those 
QALYs are likely to be lost in its 23 broad programme budget cat-
egories. The authors claim that this explicit quantification of the 
scale of opportunity costs the NHS faces provides a basis for deter-
mining the appropriate threshold for NICE decisions, as well as 
those made centrally by the NHS and Department of Health.
For those concerned with the inadequacies of the QALY as an effec-
tiveness measure, the report emphasises that the estimation methods 
can cope with other outcomes, such as patient-reported outcome 
measures (PROMs), subject to their being brought within the oppor-
tunity cost framework3. The methods can also be extended to allow 
weights to be attached to the type of health that is forgone.
However, neither this impressive empirical progress, nor the sub-
sequent debate4,5 impinge on the present argument concerning the 
biased application of the cost-effectiveness principle. This empiri-
cal advance will simply make it easier to establish the displace-
ment consequences of new cost-effective innovations, wherever 
and however they occur. As has been the case since the founding 
of NICE, the report and discussion ignores the mammoth standing 
silently in the south-west corner of the policy room: the proper use 
of cost-effectiveness as a criterion.
From its inception NICE has never adopted the principle of cost-
effectiveness, only the censored version of it called incremental 
cost-effectiveness. The Claxton report accepts this corruption of 
the principle, the single peripheral mention of decremental cost-
effectiveness being buried under the heading ‘multiple thresholds’ 
in an Appendix. As independent analysts, they might be expected 
to state, upfront in one sentence, that it is in the light of the NICE 
remit that they exclude from consideration any intervention which 
is cost-effective by being less effective, but less costly.
The objective in section 2 below is to end the sinister bifurcation 
of the single and unified cost-effectiveness principle. Separating 
incremental and decremental cost-effectiveness is as meaningful as 
separating right-handed and left-handed ambidexterity. It may be 
helpful for operational reasons to characterise the differing origins 
of cost-effectiveness, but the two cannot be separated for policy 
purposes without abandoning the principle.
In section 3 we present and seek to counter the main arguments 
against accepting and promoting innovations that fall in the 
South-West (SW) quadrant of the cost-effectiveness plane and 
under a linear Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (ICER).
One of the most powerful reasons for the individual citizen to 
favour a National Health Service will be its rationality from a 
Rawlsian perspective. Under great uncertainty (approximating a 
‘veil of ignorance’) as to what diseases and conditions oneself, one’s 
children, grandchildren and significant others will suffer from in the 
future, the greater the reason to support the consistent application 
of the principle of cost-effectiveness throughout the system. And 
hence the greater the reason for bodies making decisions within it to 
treat South-West innovations in exactly the same way as North-East 
ones, using the same threshold10.
The integrity of the cost-effectiveness principle
We believe we can achieve our aim quickly and simply, by taking 
the key diagram in Claxton, confined to the North-East (NE) quad-
rant of the cost-effectiveness plane, and extending it to include all 
its four quadrants (Figure 1). The original figure in Claxton implic-
itly acknowledges the existence of the SW quadrant by extending 
the dotted ICER, or threshold, line for a short distance into it, doing 
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so without distortion or kink1,2. (A kinked threshold line, steeper 
in the SW quadrant than in the NE, is one of the main arguments 
considered in part 2.) We can leave the South-East and North-West 
quadrants empty, as having dominated solutions that make the argu-
ment here irrelevant. Any new technology in the SE quadrant should 
be adopted as cost-effective and, because it both costs less and is 
more effective, trumps any other intervention beneath the ICER line 
in either the NE or SW quadrants. (It will often be referred to as 
‘cost-saving’ rather than ‘cost-effective’ by those whose attention is 
restricted to the eastern hemisphere.)
Essentially we duplicate the Claxton diagram, rotate the duplicate 
through 180 degrees and place it in the SW quadrant. And relabel 
appropriately. For the text explanation accompanying the Claxton dia-
gram and our translation of it for the SW quadrant, see the Appendix.
All we intend, and need, to show in this section, is that interventions 
NEA and SWA are equally cost-effective, both resulting in a Net 
Health Benefit increase of 1 QALY. NEA adds 2 and loses 1. SWA 
adds 3 and loses 2. Case made. QED.
NEB (+2, -2) and SWB (-2, +2) are both neutral, involving equal 
gain and loss.
Neither NEC (+2, -3) or SWC (-2, +1) is cost-effective, with loss 
exceeding gain.
Any intervention below the dotted ICER line is cost-effective – 
assuming it is not dominated, i.e. there is not an intervention that 
is further south and at least as far to the east, or further east and at 
least as far to the south.
Figure 1. Full cost-effectiveness plane based on Claxton’s figure1 confined to North-East quadrant.
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It is important to use consistent terminology throughout the plane. 
There is much talk about ‘disinvestment’ in the threshold debate, 
with the QALY lost by investing in NEA characterised as such. But 
SWA also represents an investment in new technology and the two 
QALYs lost as a result are the disinvestment resulting from this new 
investment.
This diagram, like any cost-effectiveness plane or analysis, assumes 
a particular threshold. But it should be clear that the slope of the 
ICER (whether the threshold is 13k, 20k or 30k), how much uncer-
tainty surrounds any empirical calculation of it, and where dis-
placement or disinvestment specifically occurs - are all irrelevant 
to the present argument. The diagram simply confirms that the 
principle of cost-effectiveness, justified either on efficiency or ethi-
cal grounds, requires its implementation in unbiased form, treating 
incremental and decremental origins as equally valid. If censoring 
is undertaken, it should be explicitly acknowledged as representing 
the abandonment of the cost-effectiveness principle and justifica-
tion sought on other grounds.
It will be obvious that the lower the threshold, the smaller the area 
under the ICER line in the NE quadrant and the greater the area 
under it in the SW quadrant; hence the greater the scope for inter-
ventions to be developed within the latter. At the limit, if the thresh-
old were approaching at, or approaching zero, all interventions in 
the SW quadrant would be cost-effective, and none in the NE.
Having rejected the principle of cost-effectiveness as the basis for 
ruling out SW innovations, what other grounds might be advanced 
against adopting or encouraging them?
Go South West? The arguments and counter-arguments
“SW interventions are simply wrong because they take away from 
them something people already have.” 
The simplest argument against treating the SW and NE quadrants in 
the same way boils down to the rights-based objection that adopt-
ing a SW intervention would involve ‘taking away’ effectiveness 
(in this illustration, QALYs) from individuals who currently enjoy 
it. No benefits to others can justify this breach of rights, it is said. 
But this principle, even if it were to be agreed that current recipi-
ents would not be forced to move on to the less effective treatment 
because it is now the cost-effective one, lacks any justification when 
extended to those who acquire the same condition in the future. 
Having never enjoyed the effectiveness of the old treatment, they 
cannot have a right to it taken away from them. Those who become 
ill later cannot ethically be favoured, simply because they suffer 
from this disease or condition, rather than from some other one. The 
Rawlsian rationality of this social ethic, even from an individual 
perspective, is clear.
‘… the rational Rawlsian patient – who does not yet know 
whether they will personally suffer from condition X, … or, 
instead, from any of the wide range of other possible conditions – 
should clearly favour the wider distribution of benefits that 
comes from applying the decision rule consistently in the SW as 
well as NE quadrant.’6 p.457
“SW interventions will produce ill health which will require treat-
ment and impose extra costs” 
Gandjour7 argues that the experience of loss, or even anticipation of 
loss, can have negative health consequences of various sorts. Unfor-
tunately apart from the individual focus of his example8, Gandjour 
fails to address the key issue regarding intervention for any ‘los-
saversionitis’ resulting from the introduction of SW interventions. 
Consistency and equity demands that realistic interventions for los-
saversionitis go into the cost-effectiveness analysis, along with all 
other interventions. So, while the illness created may be real, there 
is no guarantee it will be treated. Prevention of lossaversionitis may 
be the optimal strategy.
“SW interventions should not occur unless it can be shown that 
there will be a net increase in health”
Sendi, Gafni and Birch’s challenge to the SW argument helps clar-
ify an important point as to why we adhere to it and reject their 
alternative9. They point out that there is no guarantee that the amount 
of resources released by a specific SW intervention will result in a 
net increase in QALYs. This will occur only if the resources are 
diverted to an intervention that will achieve this and not every inter-
vention below the ICER line will do so. Correct. But the inability 
to determine specifically where the resources are diverted from to 
fund a new intervention in the NE quadrant is also unknown. So 
fundamentally their objection is to the use of an ‘overall subjec-
tive ICER threshold’ for the NE, not just the SW. Their alternative 
approach involves use of a ‘decision maker’s plane’, where a spe-
cific intervention replaces a specific intervention only if the effect 
on overall health gain is positive. This is simply not the real world 
of any national health service, let alone the NHS, as pointed out by 
Claxton and colleagues:
‘NICE cannot be expected to reflect what is likely to be marked 
variation between local commissioners and providers in how 
they react to an effective reduction in their budget as a result of 
positive guidance. Given NICE’s remit, it is the expected health 
effects (in terms of length and QoL) of the average displacement 
within the current NHS (given existing budgets, productivity 
and the quality of local decisions) that is relevant to the estimate 
of the threshold.’2 p.8
We see no justification for imposing higher requirements of specifi-
city regarding displacement on SW interventions than on NE ones.
“Some SW interventions are acceptable, but only those under a 
(very) kinked ICER” 
Some see validity in the SW argument but wish to restrict its appli-
cation. The main mechanism suggested is a ‘kinked’ ICER - a 
threshold line which is steeper in the SW quadrant than it is in the 
NE one10. The slope in the SW quadrant should reflect the ‘accept-
able’ Willingness to Accept/Willingness to Pay (WTA/WTP) ratio. 
This will be greater than 1, hence the steeper slope. Along similar 
lines, Kent, et al. suggest establishing a Maximally Acceptable Dif-
ference (MAD) in an ‘acceptability trial’ for SW interventions11, the 
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MAD being ‘a level of inferiority beyond which a new less expen-
sive agent would no longer be attractive when compared to the best 
standard.’
The most frequent objection to the SW argument is that attitudes to 
loss and gain (WTA and WTP) are asymmetric, with WTA typically 
higher or much higher than WTP, because of ‘loss aversion’. While 
income and other factors play some role, the dominant explanation 
offered for such loss aversion is the so-called ‘endowment effect’. 
‘We’ regard losing a specified amount of what we already possess 
as proportionately worse than gaining that same amount and require 
greater compensation to accept the loss than we would pay for an 
equal size gain.
Numerous empirical studies have confirmed loss aversion as 
descriptively true at the individual and aggregated individual level, 
so this is not in dispute. Nor is the fact that the WTA/WTP ratio var-
ies from situation to situation. In an example particularly relevant 
for this paper
… the farther a good is from being an ordinary private good, 
the higher the ratio…. Ratios are highest for health/safety and 
public/non-market goods, next highest for ordinary private… 
The closer the good comes to being actual money, the smaller 
the ratio.12 pp.434–5
Grutters et al.13 found that using a WTA and a WTP format for the 
cost attribute in a discrete choice experiment (on transferring ele-
ments of hearing aid provision from the medical sector to private 
hearing aid dispenser) elicited different preferences and monetary 
values . They concluded
Most discrete choice experiments in health care use the con-
cept of WTP, but WTA has also been used… to our knowledge, 
no study has paid explicit attention to when the cost attribute 
should be defined as a payment or a discount. The lack of clar-
ity on how to address the disparity between WTA and WTP 
in discrete choice experiments probably results from the fact 
that before the present study, the disparity had not yet been 
examined…13 p.1118
The case for adopting a SW intervention becomes progressively 
stronger as the saving from the loss of a QALY increases. If there is 
a way one can save 60k rather than 30k by giving up a QALY, then 
the benefits generated elsewhere are doubled. But whether a SW 
intervention is cost-effective always depends on the ICER.
In a pharma-sponsored study Liew, et al. calculated that shifting 
patients from their atorvastatin to simvastatin would lead to a net cost 
saving of €131 per subject, but also a loss of 0.03 quality-adjusted 
life-years (QALYs) per subject14. These equated to a decremental 
cost-effectiveness ratio of €4,777 per QALY lost. The authors’ 
conclusion that ‘It would be cost effective to maintain patients on 
atorvastatin for primary prevention rather than switch them to sim-
vastatin’ is valid, given the threshold is set above €4,777.
In an example relating to a new intervention for pain management, 
Soares and Dumville report a decremental ratio of £1,220, going 
on to show in a Cost Effectiveness Acceptability Curve analysis 
that this would be cost-effective only at very low thresholds15. The 
authors leave it ambiguous as to whether the decision rule (thresh-
old) they rightly say is required in both NE and SE quadrants 
should be the same one. We maintain that the principle of cost-
effectiveness requires that they be the same and that no logical or 
ethical case can be made for any kinked ICER in a public system16. 
We question the relevance of aggregated asymmetric individual 
preference results to group level policy making, in the context of 
a resource-constrained system committed to equitable efficiency. 
The fact that the Grutters study not only produced different ratios 
for ‘gainers’ and ‘losers’, but that the two sets of results also 
depended on how the cost attribute was framed, confirms to us 
that permitting this ratio to be other than 1 is unethical at a societal 
level. Searching for the conditions under which one or other fram-
ing should be used, which they contemplate, is inappropriate, since 
an equitable public policy requires an unbiased single estimate of 
WTP&A.
Establishing that single value becomes the research challenge. 
Whether it will result in a ICER near the current NE one is 
unknown, because stated community preferences have never been 
investigated under the appropriate, Rawlsian, conditions of com-
plete uncertainty as to where the investment and disinvestment 
will fall, and hence complete uncertainty about the future personal 
implications for the respondent.
“Prospect theory and psychic numbing are legitimate bases for 
public policy”
Descriptive theories of decision making, such as prospect theory, 
claim that individuals do not maximise expected value or utility, 
instead treating probabilities as non-linear and having value func-
tions that are concave for gains and convex for losses17. This may 
or may not be true at the individual level, but if is, to be used as 
the basis for rejecting SW policy interventions, transportation 
from the individual to society needs to be regarded as legitimate. 
In what Featherstonhaugh, Slovic and others refer to as ‘psychic 
numbing’ and the ‘collapse of compassion’, the value of a life- 
saving intervention emerges as being, in line with prospect theory, 
inversely proportional to the magnitude of the threat, rather than 
being determined by the absolute number of lives the intervention 
can save18,19.
We argue that the inability to relate emotionally to the loss of a 
relatively small amount of health by very large numbers, compared 
to the ability to relate to the gain of even a moderate amount for an 
identified individual – say one QALDay for 30,000 people com-
pared with 1 QALY for one person - is to be treated as a problem to 
be addressed and overcome at the policy level, not to be automati-
cally accommodated.
Discussion
The bias in relation to innovation is a corollary of the fundamental 
one. NICE is charged with objectives other than maximising the 
increase in public health and among its other obligations is to sup-
port innovation. But this turns out to be biased support, in that no 
support can be provided for the development of technologies that 
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are simply cost-effective. These would include innovations which 
could improve population health by being less costly and less 
effective – such as SWA in Figure 1, or ones further to the east of 
the SW quadrant, including the ones that would fall under a kinked 
ICER, or meet the MAD test of Kent et al. No innovation in the SW 
quadrant can meet the filter test of clinical effectiveness adminis-
tered prior to the test of cost-effectiveness. So while NICE has a 
remit to support the adoption of innovative new technologies, in 
practice the support is confined to those that will cost more.
Eckerman and Pekarsky have exposed the weaknesses of the cur-
rent NICE procedures as contributions to improved allocative 
efficiency in the NHS6. Unless the disinvestment to fund a new 
technology occurs in the least cost-effective activity in the whole 
service, then allocative efficiency will not be improved as much as 
it could be, and indeed is quite likely to be reduced.
This is indisputable conceptually, but even more important, the 
existence of the missing knowledge of the actual shadow price 
would pose extreme difficulties for NICE. As Paulden and col-
leagues point out.
The use of thresholds based upon Eckermann and Pekarsky’s 
proposals by reimbursement bodies would likely result in fewer 
new technologies being adopted by public healthcare systems. 
To the extent that this might provide opportunity for resources 
to be reallocated into more efficient existing health services, this 
ought to be welcomed. Nevertheless, the implied consequence 
that technologies be rejected on the basis that there is a preferred 
option, but one that cannot be implemented, may be a bridge too 
far for most reimbursement bodies. This is particularly true for 
NICE, which has a remit, amongst other things, to support the 
adoption of innovative new technologies, and which operates in 
a political environment where the adoption of such a low thresh-
old might be untenable.7 p.318
Perhaps the supreme irony in this respect is that ‘innovations’ fall-
ing in the SW quadrant are in fact daily occurrences in most health 
services, though the denial of this reality, seen as necessary for 
political survival, persists. The problem is not merely that such SW 
innovations are disguised or denied - we see them as essential to the 
future of any National Health Service - but that they occur dispro-
portionately in politically vulnerable areas of the service and with 
no consideration, even informal, of whether they were cost-effective 
at any threshold. For example, reducing the numbers of staff such 
as nurses, saves money at the expense of the effectiveness/quality 
of the service. The common pretence is that such a change falls in 
the SE quadrant, usually on its western border where no loss is suf-
fered, few having the audacity to claim it actually increases effec-
tiveness. This fools only those who wish to be fooled, who may or 
may not include the managers responsible, whose careers depend 
on delivering apparently SE changes within shrinking budgets.
None of this is in any way intended to discourage the search for and 
implementation of SE innovations. But the much publicised LEAN 
ones, which involve working smarter not harder, may well fall in 
the SW quadrant, as well as the SE, and still represent increased 
cost-effectiveness20.
There is, also ironically, an excellent example of NICE implement-
ing a SW innovation in its own operations: its introduction of the 
cheaper Single Technology Appraisal, where the manufacturer is 
responsible for the analysis and an independent team is paid only 
to critique it, not conduct a full-scale Multi Technology Assessment 
using all appropriate comparators21. It seems politically unaccept-
able to admit that this is undoubtedly reducing the quality of the 
appraisal, even though the reduction could conceivably be relatively 
small and the cost saving large, thereby releasing resources for other 
uses - the essence of the SW argument.
It is not as if the key underlying issue is not well recognised by 
Claxton and colleagues22
One explanation for… ‘Acceptance creep’ (in the NICE appraisal 
process) is that the broad selection of stakeholders who con-
tribute to the NICE process excludes a key constituency: those 
unidentified NHS patients who bear the true opportunity costs 
of NICE decisions. NICE undoubtedly faces extensive pres-
sure from the direct beneficiaries of a positive recommenda-
tion, including manufacturers, the patients who might benefit 
and their clinicians. Indeed, these stakeholder groups have, quite 
appropriately, become an important part of the appraisal proc-
ess. However, without institutional leadership to ensure balance, 
there is much less pressure to take full account of the likely 
impact on other NHS patients. The most recent evidence and 
the nature of the recent proposals suggests that NICE is not pro-
viding sufficient leadership and is failing to uphold this critical 
responsibility to all NHS patients.1 p.2
The evidence suggests that more harm than good is being done, 
but it is the unidentified and unrepresented NHS patients who 
bear the true (health) opportunity costs. Although finding rea-
sons to approve new drugs is undoubtedly politically expedient, 
this cannot be ethically literate, because the interests of NHS 
patients, whether they are identifiable or not, are just as real 
and equally deserving of the type of care and compassion that 
can be offered by a collectively funded health care system. It 
is to be hoped that NICE will begin to place the unidentified 
NHS patients who bear the real opportunity costs at the heart of 
its deliberative process; especially as it reconsiders how other 
attributes of benefit might be taken into account.1 p.6
The question is whether they will acknowledge that their arguments 
require at least noting the elephant in the SW corner of the policy 
room, and suggesting that it cannot be ignored by those at the table 
if they wish to pursue cost-effectiveness in an unbiased way. The 
efforts to justify this censoring of cost-effectiveness, albeit well-
intentioned in many cases, unfortunately coincide with the material 
interests of powerful stakeholders, commercial, professional and 
political, which are not always aligned with those of the citizens. 
Independent analysts need to ensure that they are not colluding, 
and, to avoid this accusation, should state explicitly that they have 
been told to not go SW.
Conclusions
The SW argument is simply that, given cost-effectiveness is the 
most important route to maximising group level health gain, not 
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applying it logically and consistently in the SW as well as the NE 
quadrant is a clear breach of the opportunity cost-effectiveness 
principle and its underlying justification. While implementing the 
principle requires many lower-level and difficult decisions23, these 
must not be allowed to undermine the case for using it.
If one wants to reject cost-effectiveness as a principle, that is clearly 
possible. But distorting it, either by refusing to consider interven-
tion in the SW quadrant or imposing different requirements (differ-
ent threshold, or different demands regarding displacement impact) 
undermines the case for employing it at all, whether on efficiency 
or ethical grounds, or both. The task is to have SW innovations 
legitimated and discussed and evaluated as transparently as those 
in the NE.
The local and global consequence of rejecting the SW argument 
is that there is little or no incentive to develop interventions that 
are cost-effective by being cheaper but less effective - especially 
ones that would be considerably cheaper but only slightly less 
effective at the individual level. These would include many non-
pharmacological interventions, including such things as health 
literacy promotion, decision support for medication adherence, or 
simple home care.
It is hard to convince people that making things better in one part 
of a system does not necessarily make them better overall, in fact 
often worse. So the ubiquitous mantra of ‘lowering costs without 
compromising quality’24 needs to be seen as part of the problem as 
well as part of the solution. There is a parallel to the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ here25.
The healthy, selfish Rawlsian concerned only with themselves and 
their relatives should consider the opportunity costs of all policy 
decisions as if they were an anonymous other and therefore support 
unbiased application of the cost-effectiveness principle.
Caveat emptor must be the message to potential NICE buyers, par-
ticularly in low or middle income countries26, but certainly not only 
in them.
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Appendix
Text adapted from 1. This text has been modified to refer to the NE quadrant of Figure 1 and includes additional labels: NHB, NEA, 
and NEB.
“As [Figure 1] illustrates, CEA effectively becomes an analysis of net health benefits [(NHBs)]: does the health gain from the new inter-
vention outweigh the health decrements associated with the displacement of existing services necessary to fund it? [Figure 1] shows the 
incremental costs and QALYs associated with a new intervention [NEA] relative to a comparator (the latter being shown at the origin). The 
new intervention generates 2 additional QALYs per patient and, at price P1, imposes an additional £20,000 per patient; the ICER is, there-
fore, £10,000 per QALY gained. At a threshold of £20,000 per QALY, the additional cost of £20,000 per patient translates into a decrement 
of 1 QALY (the distance between the y-axis and the threshold). This is because the threshold indicates the additional cost that needs to be 
imposed on the NHS budget in order to displace services that result in 1 QALY being forgone. Therefore, at that price, there is a net health 
gain of 1 QALY per patient (2 gained from the new intervention and 1 forgone through displacement). At a price of P2, the additional cost 
per patient of the new intervention [NEB] is £40,000 and the net health gain is 0: the 2 additional QALYs from the new intervention are the 
same as the QALYs forgone through displacement. At the highest price of P3, the adoption of the new intervention [NEC] would actually 
result in a net health decrement of 1 QALY as it generates fewer QALYs (2) than are forgone (3).” 1, pp. 3–4.
Text adapted from 1. This text has been modified to refer to the SW quadrant of Figure 1 and includes additional labels: NHB, 
SWA, and SWB.
“As [Figure 1] illustrates CEA effectively becomes an analysis of net health benefits [(NHBs)]: does the health gain from the new inter-
vention outweigh the health decrements associated with the displacement of existing services necessary to fund it? [Figure 1] shows the 
incremental costs and QALYs associated with a new intervention relative to a comparator (the latter being shown at the origin). The new 
intervention [SWA] generates3 additional QALYs per patient and, at [saving (negative price)] P1, [saves] £20,000 per patient; the ICER 
is, therefore, £10,000 per QALY gained. At a threshold of £20,000 per QALY, the [reduced] cost of £20,000 per patient translates into [an 
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increment] of 1 QALY (the distance between the y-axis and the threshold). This is because the threshold indicates the [reduced] cost […] 
imposed on the NHS budget [as a result of the 2 QALYs] being forgone. Therefore, at that price, there is a net health gain of 1 QALY per 
patient (3 gained from the new intervention and 2 forgone through displacement). At a [saving (negative price)] of P2, the cost [reduction] 
per patient of the new intervention [SWB] is £40,000 and the net health gain is 0: the 2 additional QALYs from the new intervention are the 
same as the QALYs forgone through displacement. At the [lowest saving (negative price)] of P3, the adoption of the new intervention [SWC] 
would actually result in a net health decrement of 1 QALY as it generates fewer QALYs1 than are forgone(2).” 1, pp. 3–4.
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I like the paper: “Caveat Emptor NICE: biased use of cost-effectiveness is inefficient and inequitable” by
Jack Dowie  and I have followed it on the way to this version. I think they have a logical point and theyet al
argue their case well. I cannot judge whether they miss some arguments against the SW case.
I have two queries that the authors and/or editors might consider to be relevant for some thought.
The kinkiness issue is discussed at some length on page 5, but to me it is unclear whether it is an
ethical and logical issue, as the authors conclude (referring to an earlier Dowie paper that I have
not read) or whether it is an empirical issue i.e. whether kinkiness should reflect the WTP/WTA
ratio “in society”, i.e. take loss aversion into account. In the analysis they state “We maintain that
the principle of cost-effectiveness requires that they be the same and that no logical or ethical case
can be made for any kinked ICER in a public system” and in the Discussion it seems that the
authors accept the MAD principle which could imply kinked ICERs in the plane quadrants.
 
The other point is more practical – how would you administer SW cases. In the NE quadrant you
document clinical efficacy and have some cost estimates to estimate ICERs, with cost data from
typically secondary endpoints supplemented with observational cost data. In the SW quadrant,
should you document cost savings, i.e. have costs as the primary end points for strong cost saving
evidence? Should we/authorities encourage pharmaceutical and other industries to develop cost
saving drugs and devices with inferior health effects? For example accept inferior generics – if cost
savings are large enough? Or is the SW quadrant more relevant with the health providers cost
saving ‘innovations’ when third party payers demand cost controls and budget cuts? What would
the SW quadrant cases be?
Besides these two queries I think the paper is ready to be indexed.
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Interventions falling under a kinked ICER, or meeting the MAD criterion in the SW quadrant, are
indeed SW interventions. But as a result they fall outside the ones NICE can consider as
innovatory, which was the opening point in the Discussion. Our fundamental point is that the ethical
justification of the use of CEA is the existence of opportunity costs in a resource-constrained
national health service. It is both unethical and illogical (given the definition of CE) to apply this only
to interventions that are incrementally cost-effective (fall under the chosen ICER threshold in the
NE quadrant) but not to interventions which are decrementally cost-effective (fall under the same
ICER threshold in the SW quadrant). There is therefore no ethical justification for a kinked ICER, or
any other criterion (e.g. MAD) which partitions under-ICER SW interventions into those that are
acceptable and not acceptable. Using the empirically observed difference between WTA and WTP
infringes the ethical basis for the use of CEA.
There are undoubtedly practical issues in calculating both the potential cost savings and loss of
effectiveness for SW interventions, but we suggest these cannot trump the ethical case for tackling
the task, anymore than they do in the NE quadrant. As to the sources of SW interventions, it is
worth repeating that many cost saving changes are, in reality, SW interventions being presented as
SE ones. However, the essence of the argument is that providers should indeed be seeking
interventions that are inferior in effectiveness for a particular subgroup, but generate more benefits
to the whole population for which they are responsible and accountable. Using CEA in a biased
way is a purely political decision that has no scientific justification. 
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There are times when health economics articles are dense and jargon laden. There are other times when
health economics articles seem to say what common sense suggests anyway.
This article is neither of these. It speaks with logic, authority and a great deal of wisdom about the
importance of potential bias in the UK’s National Institute for Care and Health Excellence (NICE) and its
approach to cost-effectiveness. The authors make the case that at the end of the day, “while NICE has a
remit to support the adoption of innovative new technologies, in practice the support is confined to those
that will cost more.” The authors want NICE and by extension anyone involved in this sort of appraisal not
to omit to consider innovations and technologies that are simply cost-effective (as compared to those that
are firstly determined to be clinically effective, and then assessed for cost-effectiveness).
Without going into the detailed economic and conceptual arguments, which is of less interest to general
readers, it is surely incumbent on policymakers to review this argument and take notice of it, or refute it.
Either way, we should hear more about the potential of NICE to refine how it enables cost-effectiveness
and innovation. Given the role NICE plays nationally and internationally, this is by no means a trivial
request. 
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